Engineering social concepts: Feasibility and causal models.
How feasible are conceptual engineering projects of social concepts that aim for the engineered concept to be deployed in people's ordinary conceptual practices? Predominant frameworks on the psychology of concepts that shape work on stereotyping, bias, and machine learning have grim implications fo...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 109; no. 3; pp. 819 - 838 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=183923331&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 183923331 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2024 vid: 109 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 183923331 10.1111/phpr.13064 ppf: 819 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 605KB tig: atl: Engineering social concepts: Feasibility and causal models. aug: au: Neufeld, Eleonore affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst su: Social psychology Causal models Stereotypes Machine learning Engineers sug: subj: Social psychology Causal models Stereotypes Machine learning Engineers ab: How feasible are conceptual engineering projects of social concepts that aim for the engineered concept to be deployed in people's ordinary conceptual practices? Predominant frameworks on the psychology of concepts that shape work on stereotyping, bias, and machine learning have grim implications for the prospects of conceptual engineers: conceptual engineering efforts are ineffective in promoting certain social‐conceptual changes. Since conceptual components that give rise to problematic social stereotypes are sensitive to statistical structures of the environment, purely conceptual change won't be possible without corresponding world change. This tradition, however, tends to ignore that concepts don't only encode statistical, but also causal information. Paying attention to this feature of concepts, I argue, shows that conceptual engineering is not only possible. There is an imperative to conceptually‐engineer. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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