Attention as selection for action defended.
Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I sho...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 110; no. 2; pp. 421 - 442 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=183952706&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 183952706 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2025 vid: 110 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 183952706 10.1111/phpr.13101 ppf: 421 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 445KB tig: atl: Attention as selection for action defended. aug: au: Wu, Wayne affil: Carnegie Mellon University, Philosophy and The Neuroscience Institute su: Attention Work ethic Theory of knowledge Philosophers Conception sug: subj: Attention Work ethic Theory of knowledge Philosophers Conception ab: Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive scientist studies it. That is, selection for action pulls empirical and folk‐psychology together. Accordingly, philosophers who take seriously either source have reason to work with selection for action as their starting conception of attention. This conception provides a way to bridge empirical and philosophical concerns where attention is central. The theoretical advantages of selection for action have been obscured by the common opinion that it is easily refuted. I defend the position against many of the published objections and then deploy it to provide a foundation for the intuitive, but inchoate, idea of attention being gradable, something of which there can be more or less. An analysis of the gradability of attention is then applied to consider recent work on the harms due to a surplus of attention. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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