Absence and objectivity.
I first show that a growing body of literature about the phenomenological and epistemic role of the structural features of experience can be recruited in favour of the view that absence experience is non‐veridical. Then I argue that such literature is in fact amenable to the view that absence experi...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 110; no. 2; pp. 374 - 403 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I first show that a growing body of literature about the phenomenological and epistemic role of the structural features of experience can be recruited in favour of the view that absence experience is non‐veridical. Then I argue that such literature is in fact amenable to the view that absence experience is veridical if we rethink our conception of absence, and presence, itself. |
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