How theoretical terms effectively refer.
Scientific realists with traditional semantic inclinations are often pressed to explain away the distinguished series of referential failures that seem to plague our best past science. As recent debates make it particularly vivid, a central challenge is to find a reliable and principled way to asses...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 4; pp. 1 - 23 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184294576&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184294576 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 205 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 184294576 10.1007/s11229-025-04958-z ppf: 1 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: How theoretical terms effectively refer. aug: au: Rivat, Sébastien affil: https://ror.org/05591te55 Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, Munich, Germany sug: keyword: Effective field theories Reference Scientific realism Selective realism Theoretical terms ab: Scientific realists with traditional semantic inclinations are often pressed to explain away the distinguished series of referential failures that seem to plague our best past science. As recent debates make it particularly vivid, a central challenge is to find a reliable and principled way to assess referential success at the time a theory is still a live concern. In this paper, I argue that this is best done in the case of physics by examining whether the putative referent of a term is specifiable within the limited domain delineated by the range of parameters over which the theory at stake is empirically accurate. I first implement this selective principle into a general account of reference, building on Stathis Psillos’s works. Then, I show that this account offers a remarkably reliable basis to assess referential success before theory change in the case of effective theories. Finally, I briefly show that this account still works well with other physical examples and explain how it helps us to handle problematic cases in the history of physical sciences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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