Bi-level evaluative epistemology.
During the last decade we have witnessed a stagnated debate on the epistemic nature of emotion with two clear factions: those who defend that emotions are epistemically akin to perception and those who deny it. In this paper I propose a way out of that impasse. Based on Sosa’s distinction, I propose...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 4; pp. 1 - 23 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184294804&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184294804 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 205 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 184294804 10.1007/s11229-025-04929-4 ppf: 1 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 949KB tig: atl: Bi-level evaluative epistemology. aug: au: Álvarez-González, Aarón affil: https://ror.org/043nxc105 University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain sug: keyword: Animal and reflective knowledge Emotions’ epistemic role Emotions' epistemic role Virtue epistemology ab: During the last decade we have witnessed a stagnated debate on the epistemic nature of emotion with two clear factions: those who defend that emotions are epistemically akin to perception and those who deny it. In this paper I propose a way out of that impasse. Based on Sosa’s distinction, I propose that there are animal and reflective evaluative knowledge in both of which emotion’s play a non-superfluous epistemic role. On the one hand, we can devise an externalist version of perceptualism immune to traditional objections. On the other hand, we not only can but should complement that externalist position with an account of reflective evaluative knowledge, used by non-perceptualist to attack traditional, internalist versions of perceptualism. Thus, perceptualism and non-perceptualism do not disagree with each other, they are just offering an analysis of different epistemic achievements, which have different epistemic statuses and different epistemic requirements. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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