Remembering and imagining as attitudes: an interpretivist view.
The (dis)continuism problem asks if episodic memory is continuous with imagination. Given its close proximity with the cognitive sciences, philosophers have traditionally taken this issue as part of a larger naturalistic framework in the philosophy of memory. Some philosophers have argued that such...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 4; pp. 1 - 24 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184330062&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184330062 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 205 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 184330062 10.1007/s11229-025-05000-y ppf: 1 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Remembering and imagining as attitudes: an interpretivist view. aug: au: Diesel Werberich, Matheus affil: https://ror.org/01b78mz79 Department of Philosophy, Philosophy of Memory Lab, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, RS, Brazil sug: keyword: (Dis)continuism Episodic memory Imagination Interpretivism Naturalism Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology Propositional attitudes Real patterns ab: The (dis)continuism problem asks if episodic memory is continuous with imagination. Given its close proximity with the cognitive sciences, philosophers have traditionally taken this issue as part of a larger naturalistic framework in the philosophy of memory. Some philosophers have argued that such naturalistic methodology entails the need for philosophers to also take the mental attitudes of remembering and imagining into account. However, the naturalistic methodology is concerned with making ontological claims on the basis of the relevant explanatory terms inside the framework of the empirical sciences. It is unclear whether attitudes have such a role in the cognitive sciences, specially cognitive neuroscience. Without such an account of their relevancy, one could argue that it is unlikely that “remembering” and “imagining” have any significant role in naturalistic philosophy. Such is the exclusion argument. In this paper, I offer an account of how mental attitudes indirectly correspond to neural mechanisms to show how the exclusion argument is not sound. This account, named interpretivism, not only supports pluralism about (dis)continuism, but also indicates how empirical and epistemic meanings of “remembering” could be integrated in our thinking about memory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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