Dated Truths Without Dated Powers.

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 4; pp. 1605 - 1626
Autores principales: Giannini, Giacomo, Donati, Donatella
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184383504&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 184383504
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2025
      vid: 90
      iid: 4
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        184383504
        10.1007/s10670-023-00767-3
      ppf: 1605
      ppct: 21
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 871KB
      tig:
        atl: Dated Truths Without Dated Powers.
      aug:
        au:
          Giannini, Giacomo
          Donati, Donatella
        affil:
          https://ror.org/024z2rq82 Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
          https://ror.org/01j9p1r26 Department of Philosophy, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, L'Aquila, Italy
      su:
        Parsimonious models
        Ontology
        Explanation
        Time
      sug:
        subj:
          Parsimonious models
          Ontology
          Explanation
          Time
      ab: Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task by examining how Dispositionalism deals with 'dated truths': propositions involving a specific time, e.g. "It might rain at 12.30". We examine two possible accounts: the first, 'Dated Manifestations Strategy', is the idea that powers are very fine-grained, and tend towards temporally very specific manifestations. We argue that such strategy should not be adopted, for it leads to unnecessary violations of ontological parsimony; it is unable to accommodate an ontology of platonic universals; and it is incapable of offering a principled explanation of the forward-looking nature of powers. We offer an alternative account, the "Duration Strategy", which relies on an independently determined arrow of time and the existence of some "duration facts" that specify how long a power takes to bring about its manifestation. We argue that the Duration Strategy is to be preferred. We then flesh out the account by exploring the connection between powers, duration facts, and processes.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2025
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N