Externalist XAI?
Developers of artificial intelligence (AI) often cannot explain the inferences their neural networks make, at least not in ways that satisfy user needs. XAI—explainable artificial intelligence—aims to develop techniques for providing such explanations. XAI researchers have adopted techniques that, t...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 91; no. 2; pp. 1 - 15 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184518571&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184518571 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 91 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 184518571 10.1111/theo.12581 ppf: 1 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 231KB tig: atl: Externalist XAI? aug: au: Søgaard, Anders affil: Department of Computer Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Department of Communication Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark su: Artificial intelligence Philosophers Epistemics Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Philosophical analysis sug: subj: Artificial intelligence Philosophers Epistemics Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Philosophical analysis keyword: explainable artificial intelligence externalism functionalism ab: Developers of artificial intelligence (AI) often cannot explain the inferences their neural networks make, at least not in ways that satisfy user needs. XAI—explainable artificial intelligence—aims to develop techniques for providing such explanations. XAI researchers have adopted techniques that, to philosophers, seem representationalist–internalist, leading some philosophers to call for more externalist alternatives. But is explaining AI models through causally related external factors feasible? I suggest we compare the idea of externalist XAI to so‐called functionalist XAI. Two common arguments against functionalist XAI are the Epistemic Argument and the Trust Argument, respectively. I discuss whether these arguments can be met by externalists, as well as a new, previously unnoticed challenge from random initialization. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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