Loving Beyond the Human: anthropocentric and anthropomorphic values in the loving and hating of nonhuman animals.
I offer an account of the centrality of values to moral experience and the ways in which value disorder characterizes our relationships with nonhuman animals. To do this, I first provide an account of Max Scheler’s phenomenology of values, including the hierarchy of values, and loving and hating as...
| Publicado en: | Between the Species: A Journal for the Study of Philosophy & Animals Vol. 28; no. 1; pp. 125 - 147 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Between the Species
Summer2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184660364&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184660364 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 19458487 1GN1 jtl: Between the Species: A Journal for the Study of Philosophy & Animals issn: 19458487 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Summer2025 vid: 28 iid: 1 pid: 26472 pub: Between the Species artinfo: ui: 184660364 ppf: 125 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 502KB tig: atl: Loving Beyond the Human: anthropocentric and anthropomorphic values in the loving and hating of nonhuman animals. aug: au: Takata-Struble, Stephanie M. su: Value orientations Anthropomorphism Phenomenology sug: subj: Value orientations Anthropomorphism Phenomenology ab: I offer an account of the centrality of values to moral experience and the ways in which value disorder characterizes our relationships with nonhuman animals. To do this, I first provide an account of Max Scheler’s phenomenology of values, including the hierarchy of values, and loving and hating as value orientations. Drawing on this account, I map out two value orientations specific to our relationships with animals—anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. Within these two value orientations, I detail three specific forms of valuation—gustatory, cosmetic, and anthropomorphic substitution—which demonstrate the ways in which humans’ naïve love for the nonhuman animal is often, phenomenologically, a hating of the nonhuman as the necessarily other than human. I argue that valuing nonhuman animals as nonhuman, vital individuals is central to correcting these persistent and pervasive value disorders that prevent us from genuine love and moral consideration of the nonhuman. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Between the Species: A Journal for the Study of Philosophy & Animals is the property of Between the Species and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Between the Species: A Journal for the Study of Philosophy & Animals holder: Between the Species dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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