Between Burgess and Lewis – Part I: Logics without Rational Monotonicity.
The last 50 years of research has taught us that conditionals are non-monotonic in the antecedent. That is, they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening. Many accounts have been developed for such conditionals, starting with Stalnaker and Lewis. These accounts converge roughly to Burgess' conditional lo...
| Published in: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 291 - 328 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184914720&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184914720 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 54 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 184914720 10.1007/s10992-025-09787-6 ppf: 291 ppct: 37 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 607KB tig: atl: Between Burgess and Lewis – Part I: Logics without Rational Monotonicity. aug: au: Raidl, Eric affil: https://ror.org/03a1kwz48 Cluster of Excellence "Machine Learning for Science", Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Maria-von-Linden-Strasse 6, 72076, Tübingen, Germany su: Nonmonotonic logic Semantics (Philosophy) Semantics Hypothesis Logic sug: subj: Nonmonotonic logic Semantics (Philosophy) Semantics Hypothesis Logic keyword: 03B25 03B42 03B45 03B52 03B60 03B65 03Bxx 03C30 03C35 06A05 06A06 91C05 91F20 Completeness Conditionals Decidability Disjunctive rationality Finite model property Rational monotonicity ab: The last 50 years of research has taught us that conditionals are non-monotonic in the antecedent. That is, they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening. Many accounts have been developed for such conditionals, starting with Stalnaker and Lewis. These accounts converge roughly to Burgess' conditional logic B or the non-monotonic reasoning system P . The latter two have Cautious Monotonicity as a weak replacement for Antecedent Strengthening. Lewis' weakest conditional logic V or its non-monotonic reasoning counterpart system R are obtained by adding a stronger proxi for Antecedent Strengthening – the law of Rational Monotonicity. I argue that Rational Monotonicity is too much while Cautious Monotonicity is not enough monotonicity. I investigate two other monotonicity postulates, which are jointly weaker than Rational Monotonicity. One of them is related to Disjunctive Rationality, the other one is related to the idea of replacing the preservation law encoded in Rational Monotonicity by a pivoting principle – instead of conserving a conclusion when adding a compatible supposition, the principle recommends pivoting from a disjunction to another disjunction when the reason for the first is undermined by such an addition. This gives rise to three logics in between B and V and three other logics in between BN and VN obtained by strengthening B and V by a consistency axiom. I prove soundness, completeness and decidability results for these six new logics, using set-selection semantics, its correspondence theory, and filtrations. In the second follow-up paper, I investigate five other semantics for the new logics: well founded strict order semantics, a new closeness semantics, several weakenings of ranking semantics, and new versions of Lewis' and Burgess' similarity semantics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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