The Berry Paradox.
Berry's Paradox, like Russell's Paradox, is a 'paradox' in name only. It differs from genuine logico-semantic paradoxes such as the Liar Paradox, Grelling's Paradox, the Postcard Paradox, Yablo's Paradox, the Knower Paradox, Prior's Intensional Paradoxes, and their ilk. These latter arise from seman...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 379 - 399 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184914721&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184914721 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 54 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 184914721 10.1007/s10992-025-09788-5 ppf: 379 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 307KB tig: atl: The Berry Paradox. aug: au: Tennant, Neil affil: https://ror.org/00rs6vg23 Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA su: Intuition Contradiction Logic Berries Postcards Paradox sug: subj: Intuition Contradiction Logic Berries Postcards Paradox keyword: Berry Definite description operator Free logic Genuine inconsistency Logico-semantic paradox Ramsey Russell ab: Berry's Paradox, like Russell's Paradox, is a 'paradox' in name only. It differs from genuine logico-semantic paradoxes such as the Liar Paradox, Grelling's Paradox, the Postcard Paradox, Yablo's Paradox, the Knower Paradox, Prior's Intensional Paradoxes, and their ilk. These latter arise from semantic closure. Their genuine paradoxicality manifests itself as the non-normalizability of the formal proofs or disproofs associated with them. The Russell, the Berry, and the Burali-Forti 'paradoxes', by contrast, simply reveal the straightforward inconsistency of their respective existential claims—that the Russell set exists; that the Berry number exists; and that the ordinal of the well-ordering of all ordinals exists. The disproofs of these existential claims are in free logic and are in normal form. They show that certain complex singular terms do not—indeed, cannot—denote. All this counsels reconsideration of Ramsey's famous division of paradoxes and contradictions into his Group A and Group B. The proof-theoretic criterion of genuine paradoxicality formally explicates an informal and occasionally confused notion. The criterion should be allowed to reform our intuitions about what makes for genuine paradoxicality, as opposed to straightforward (albeit surprising) inconsistency. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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