Responsibility in Multi-Step Decision Schemes.
Two different forms of responsibility, counterfactual and seeing-to-it, have been extensively discussed in philosophy in the context of a single agent or multiple agents acting simultaneously. Although the generalisation of counterfactual responsibility to a setting where multiple agents act in some...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 493 - 532 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=184914726&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 184914726 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 54 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 184914726 10.1007/s10992-025-09794-7 ppf: 493 ppct: 39 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 844KB tig: atl: Responsibility in Multi-Step Decision Schemes. aug: au: Shi, Qi Naumov, Pavel affil: https://ror.org/01ryk1543 School of Electronics & Computer Science, University of Southampton, University Road, SO17 1BJ, Southampton, UK su: Religious studies Intuition Generalization Responsibility Definitions sug: subj: Religious studies Intuition Generalization Responsibility Definitions keyword: Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Responsibility gap STIT Undefinability ab: Two different forms of responsibility, counterfactual and seeing-to-it, have been extensively discussed in philosophy in the context of a single agent or multiple agents acting simultaneously. Although the generalisation of counterfactual responsibility to a setting where multiple agents act in some order is relatively straightforward, the same cannot be said about seeing-to-it responsibility. Two versions of seeing-to-it modality applicable to such settings have been proposed in the literature. Neither of them perfectly captures the intuition of responsibility. This paper proposes a definition of seeing-to-it responsibility for such settings that amalgamate the two modalities. This paper shows that counterfactual responsibility and the newly proposed notion of responsibility are not definable via each other. It also studies the higher-order responsibility and the responsibility gap for these two forms of responsibility. It shows that although these two forms of responsibility are not enough to ascribe responsibility in each possible situation, this gap does not exist if higher-order responsibility is taken into account. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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