Inside Ockham's razor: A mechanism driving preferences for simpler explanations.
People often prefer simpler explanations, defined as those that posit the presence of fewer causes (e.g., positing the presence of a single cause, Cause A, rather than two causes, Causes B and C, to explain observed effects). Here, we test one hypothesis about the mechanisms underlying this preferen...
| Publicado en: | Memory & Cognition Vol. 53; no. 3; pp. 746 - 775 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=184954178&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 184954178 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0090502X MEG jtl: Memory & Cognition issn: 0090502X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 53 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 184954178 10.3758/s13421-024-01604-w ppf: 746 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2.2MB tig: atl: Inside Ockham's razor: A mechanism driving preferences for simpler explanations. aug: au: Vrantsidis, Thalia H. Lombrozo, Tania affil: https://ror.org/0432jq872 Department of Psychology, Mississippi State University, Rice Hall, 39762, Mississippi State, MS, USA https://ror.org/00hx57361 Department of Psychology, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, USA su: United States Manipulative behavior Decision making Problem solving Achievement tests Judgment (Psychology) Descriptive statistics Mathematical models Comparative studies Theory Critical thinking sug: subj: Manipulative behavior Decision making Problem solving Achievement tests Judgment (Psychology) United States Descriptive statistics Mathematical models Comparative studies Theory Critical thinking keyword: Complexity Explanation Explanatory virtues Ockham's razor Probability Simplicity Complexity Explanation Explanatory virtues Ockham's razor Probability Simplicity ab: People often prefer simpler explanations, defined as those that posit the presence of fewer causes (e.g., positing the presence of a single cause, Cause A, rather than two causes, Causes B and C, to explain observed effects). Here, we test one hypothesis about the mechanisms underlying this preference: that people tend to reason as if they are using "agnostic" explanations, which remain neutral about the presence/absence of additional causes (e.g., comparing "A" vs. "B and C," while remaining neutral about the status of B and C when considering "A," or of A when considering "B and C"), even in cases where "atheist" explanations, which specify the absence of additional causes (e.g., "A and not B or C" vs. "B and C and not A"), are more appropriate. Three studies with US-based samples (total N = 982) tested this idea by using scenarios for which agnostic and atheist strategies produce diverging simplicity/complexity preferences, and asking participants to compare explanations provided in atheist form. Results suggest that people tend to ignore absent causes, thus overgeneralizing agnostic strategies, which can produce preferences for simpler explanations even when the complex explanation is objectively more probable. However, these unwarranted preferences were reduced by manipulations that encouraged participants to consider absent causes: making absences necessary to produce the effects (Study 2), or describing absences as causes that produce alternative effects (Study 3). These results shed light on the mechanisms driving preferences for simpler explanations, and on when these mechanisms are likely to lead people astray. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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