Who's Afraid of the Base-Rate Fallacy?
This paper evaluates the back-and-forth between Mayo, Howson, and Achinstein over whether classical statistics commits the base-rate fallacy. I show that Mayo is correct to claim that Howson's arguments rely on a misunderstanding of classical theory. I then argue that Achinstein's refined version of...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 92; no. 2; pp. 453 - 470 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185035747&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185035747 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 92 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 185035747 10.1017/psa.2024.39 ppf: 453 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 217KB tig: atl: Who's Afraid of the Base-Rate Fallacy? aug: au: Dethier, Corey affil: University of Minnesota su: Argument Hypothesis Statistics Pictures sug: subj: Argument Hypothesis Statistics Pictures ab: This paper evaluates the back-and-forth between Mayo, Howson, and Achinstein over whether classical statistics commits the base-rate fallacy. I show that Mayo is correct to claim that Howson's arguments rely on a misunderstanding of classical theory. I then argue that Achinstein's refined version of the argument turns on largely undefended epistemic assumptions about "what we care about" when evaluating hypotheses. I end by suggesting that Mayo's positive arguments are no more decisive than her opponents': even if correct, they are unlikely to compel anyone not already sympathetic to the classical picture. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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