Reexamining the Psychophysical Evidence for the Two Visual Streams.
The perception/action model posits distinct streams of visual processing for perception and online motor guidance. This model is apparently supported by experiments showing that visual illusions affect action tasks less than perception. In recent years, however, critics have argued against both the...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 92; no. 2; pp. 304 - 324 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185035750&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185035750 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 92 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 185035750 10.1017/psa.2024.44 ppf: 304 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 428KB tig: atl: Reexamining the Psychophysical Evidence for the Two Visual Streams. aug: au: Henke, Benjamin affil: Department of Computing, Imperial College London and Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, UK su: Optical illusions Visual perception Critics sug: subj: Optical illusions Visual perception Critics ab: The perception/action model posits distinct streams of visual processing for perception and online motor guidance. This model is apparently supported by experiments showing that visual illusions affect action tasks less than perception. In recent years, however, critics have argued against both the validity of these experiments and their support (irrespective of their validity) for the perception/action model. In this article, I reexamine this psychophysical evidence. I argue that it strongly supports the existence of distinct representations for "perception" and "action" but only moderately supports the existence of distinct systems generating those representations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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