Let sleeping dogs lie: stereotype completion and the Phenomenology of category recognition.

Perceptual liberals have offered numerous arguments claiming to show that kind-representing perceptual phenomenology exists, which raises questions about what it is like to perceive objects as belonging to different kinds. Yet almost no effort has been made to answer these questions. This quietism i...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 3; pp. 865 - 891
Autor principal: Ashby, Brandon James
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Let sleeping dogs lie: stereotype completion and the Phenomenology of category recognition.
      aug:
        au: Ashby, Brandon James
        affil: https://ror.org/05fq50484 Department of Philosophy and Center for Vision Research, York University, Toronto, Canada
      su:
        Stereotypes
        Quietism
        Perception (Philosophy)
        Phenomenology
        Metaphysics
      sug:
        subj:
          Stereotypes
          Quietism
          Perception (Philosophy)
          Phenomenology
          Metaphysics
      keyword:
        Category recognition
        High-level phenomenology
        Kind perception
        Low-level phenomenology
        Perceptual learning
        Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology
        Unitization
      ab: Perceptual liberals have offered numerous arguments claiming to show that kind-representing perceptual phenomenology exists, which raises questions about what it is like to perceive objects as belonging to different kinds. Yet almost no effort has been made to answer these questions. This quietism invites the concern that liberalism may be a defunct research program: unable to answer the questions raised by its own development. Building on work by P.F. Strawson, a recent surge of empirical research, and theoretical considerations from the Helmholtzian paradigm of perceptual psychology, I argue that perceptual experience can complete the stereotypical features, behaviors, and affordances of kinds of objects even when only some of those features/behaviors/affordances are "on display", just as it can complete the shape of a cat behind a picket fence in amodal completion. The phenomenal character of high-level kind perception, I argue, is grounded in stereotype completion.
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    language: English
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