Social kind essentialism.
There has been widespread opposition to so-called essentialism in contemporary social theory. At the same time, within contemporary analytic metaphysics, the notion of essence has been revived and put to work by neo-Aristotelians. The 'new essentialism' of the neo-Aristotelians opens the prospect fo...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 3; pp. 1023 - 1047 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185037352&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185037352 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 182 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 185037352 10.1007/s11098-025-02307-x ppf: 1023 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 972KB tig: atl: Social kind essentialism. aug: au: Passinsky, Asya affil: https://ror.org/02zx40v98 Department of Philosophy, Central European University, Quellenstraße 51, 1100, Vienna, Austria su: Essentialism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Feminists Social theory Social change sug: subj: Essentialism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Feminists Social theory Social change keyword: Essentialism Feminist metaphysics Neo-Aristotelian Social kinds Social ontology Studies in Human Society Sociology ab: There has been widespread opposition to so-called essentialism in contemporary social theory. At the same time, within contemporary analytic metaphysics, the notion of essence has been revived and put to work by neo-Aristotelians. The 'new essentialism' of the neo-Aristotelians opens the prospect for a new social essentialism—one that avoids the problematic commitments of the 'old essentialism' while also providing a helpful framework for social theorizing. In this paper, I develop a neo-Aristotelian brand of essentialism about social kinds and show how it avoids the legitimate worries of social theorists. I then argue that neo-Aristotelian social kind essentialism provides a helpful framework for a wide range of projects in social ontology and feminist metaphysics, including debunking projects, descriptive inquiries, and the project of achieving social change. I further argue that an essentialist framework is more useful than a grounding framework when it comes to certain legitimate theoretical and practical purposes in social theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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