Primitive governance.
Laws of nature are sometimes said to govern their instances. Spelling out what governance is, however, is an important task that has only recently received sustained philosophical attention. In the first part of this paper, I argue against the two prominent reductive views of governance—modal views...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 59; no. 2; pp. 442 - 464 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185068723&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185068723 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 59 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185068723 10.1111/nous.12520 ppf: 442 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 299KB tig: atl: Primitive governance. aug: au: Gratvol, Noga affil: New York University, New York, USA su: Natural law Metaphysics Paradox Power (Social sciences) Contingency (Philosophy) sug: subj: Natural law Metaphysics Paradox Power (Social sciences) Contingency (Philosophy) ab: Laws of nature are sometimes said to govern their instances. Spelling out what governance is, however, is an important task that has only recently received sustained philosophical attention. In the first part of this paper, I argue against the two prominent reductive views of governance—modal views and grounding views. Ruling out the promising candidates for reduction supports the claim that governance is sui generis. In the second part of this paper, I argue that governance is subject to a contingency requirement. Laws govern their instances only if those instances are metaphysically contingent. I end by defending the resulting account of governance from two potential objections. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|