Frege cases and rationalizing explanations.
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanat...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 59; no. 2; pp. 517 - 542 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185068725&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185068725 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 59 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185068725 10.1111/nous.12522 ppf: 517 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 259KB tig: atl: Frege cases and rationalizing explanations. aug: au: Almotahari, Mahrad Gray, Aidan affil: University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK University of Illinois, Chicago, USA su: Propositional attitudes Meaning (Philosophy) Theory (Philosophy) sug: subj: Propositional attitudes Meaning (Philosophy) Theory (Philosophy) ab: Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other 'higher‐level' explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under‐appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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