Why "Energy Price Brakes" Encourage Moral Hazard, Raise Energy Prices, and Reinforce Energy Savings.
To help households and firms with exploding energy costs in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, a new policy called the "energy price brake" was implemented. A unique feature of this relief measure is that it provides a transfer that increases in the consumer's contractual per‐unit price of energy. In...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 129 - 145 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=185068905&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 185068905 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Summer2025 vid: 56 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185068905 10.1111/1756-2171.12489 ppf: 129 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 538KB tig: atl: Why "Energy Price Brakes" Encourage Moral Hazard, Raise Energy Prices, and Reinforce Energy Savings. aug: au: Dertwinkel‐Kalt, Markus Wey, Christian affil: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, University of Münster Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf su: Russian invasion of Ukraine, 2022- Energy industries Moral hazard Energy shortages Market design & structure (Economics) sug: subj: Russian invasion of Ukraine, 2022- Energy industries Moral hazard Energy shortages Market design & structure (Economics) keyword: energy crisis energy price brake energy price policies energy saving energy crisis energy price brake energy price policies energy saving ab: To help households and firms with exploding energy costs in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, a new policy called the "energy price brake" was implemented. A unique feature of this relief measure is that it provides a transfer that increases in the consumer's contractual per‐unit price of energy. In a formal model, we show that this policy creates incentives for moral hazard of energy providers to raise per‐unit prices. Whereas this moral hazard problem increases the policy's fiscal costs, it also reinforces energy savings. Whether the policy's main beneficiaries are consumers or firms depends on the market structure. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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