What the States of Truthmaker Semantics Could (Not) Be.

Developments in truthmaker semantics for the most part stay clear of the metaphysical issue of what sort of entities serve as the truthmakers and falsitymakers for sentences. It is assumed that perhaps facts or states of affairs (Fine 2017a; Jago 2020), with these taken sometimes as concrete particu...

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Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 44; no. 2; pp. 259 - 273
Autor principal: Silva, Francisca
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2025
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: What the States of Truthmaker Semantics Could (Not) Be.
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        au: Silva, Francisca
        affil:
          Arché Research Centre, University of St. Andrews, St Andrews, UK
          https://ror.org/01c27hj86 LanCog - University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
      su: Semantics
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        subj: Semantics
      keyword:
        Impossible worlds
        Modal realism
        Rigid embodiments
        States
        Truthmaker semantics
      ab: Developments in truthmaker semantics for the most part stay clear of the metaphysical issue of what sort of entities serve as the truthmakers and falsitymakers for sentences. It is assumed that perhaps facts or states of affairs (Fine 2017a; Jago 2020), with these taken sometimes as concrete particulars (Hawke 2018) could serve for the job, but nonetheless that some such entities would do. In this paper I take a closer look at the issue of what entities could or could not play the role of truthmakers and falsitymakers in standard truthmaker semantics (Fine 2016, 2017a, b; Fine and Jago 2019), based on desiderata imposed by metaphysical and semantic considerations.
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    language: English
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