The very possibility of contemplation: The dialectics of intellect and will in Schopenhauer's aesthetics.
In this article, I explore how Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetic experience—independently of his theory of arts—accommodates the possibility of contemplation. The standard reading of his aesthetics is that contemplation becomes possible because of a certain "surplus" of intellect and facilitating e...
| Published in: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 63; no. 1; pp. 66 - 81 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2025
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185230346&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185230346 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2025 vid: 63 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185230346 10.1111/sjp.12551 ppf: 66 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 271KB tig: atl: The very possibility of contemplation: The dialectics of intellect and will in Schopenhauer's aesthetics. aug: au: Sattar, Alexander affil: Department of Philosophy, Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany su: Contemplation Intellect Metaphysics Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1788-1860 Modern philosophy Philosophers Intention Aesthetics Cognition sug: subj: Contemplation Intellect Metaphysics Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1788-1860 Modern philosophy Philosophers Intention Aesthetics Cognition ab: In this article, I explore how Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetic experience—independently of his theory of arts—accommodates the possibility of contemplation. The standard reading of his aesthetics is that contemplation becomes possible because of a certain "surplus" of intellect and facilitating external occasions. I argue, however, that the "essential imperfections" of intellect and Schopenhauer's overall metaphysics are inconsistent with the very idea of will‐less cognition and, hence, of a free intellect. An alternative explanation of contemplation better fits with Schopenhauer's philosophy overall by stating that it is driven by the will itself. I analyze two approaches to elaborating such a theory. First, the "metaphysical" account, according to which the will as thing‐in‐itself brings forth the (surplus of) intellect needed for contemplation as a means of self‐cognition. Second, the "physiological" account, which presupposes a quasi‐evolutionary process that has aesthetic cognition as a byproduct of intellect. The two accounts complement each other and in tandem better explain the possibility of contemplation than postulating a will‐less intellect. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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