Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1.

To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were th...

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Publicado en:Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 110; no. 3; pp. 887 - 916
Autor principal: Hájek, Alan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell May2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1.
      aug:
        au: Hájek, Alan
        affil: Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra Australian Capital Territory, , Australia
      su:
        Counterfactuals (Logic)
        Philosophy
        Metaphysics
        Similarity (Psychology)
        Ethics
      sug:
        subj:
          Counterfactuals (Logic)
          Philosophy
          Metaphysics
          Similarity (Psychology)
          Ethics
      keyword:
        chances
        Counterfactuals
        Lewis
        similarity
        Stalnaker
      ab: To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were the case, C would be the case is true if and only if at the most similar A‐worlds, C is true. I will argue that there are general structural problems with the appeals to both "the most" and "similar". I will challenge any fixation on 'the most __ worlds', however we fill in the blank with a non‐trivial ordering of worlds: in ignoring worlds that are later in the ordering, it adjudicates various implausibly specific counterfactuals to be true. I will then raise foundational problems for appealing to 'similarity'—from consequents that are chancy, disjunctive antecedents, and unspecific antecedents more generally. I will also raise further problems for a number of specific proposals for understanding 'similarity'. A recurring theme will be the tension that may arise between probability and similarity considerations. I will end by arguing for a paradigm shift, replacing 'the most similar worlds' approach with one based on conditional chances.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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      src: R
    language: English
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