Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1.
To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were th...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 110; no. 3; pp. 887 - 916 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185257768&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185257768 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2025 vid: 110 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185257768 10.1111/phpr.13138 ppf: 887 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 525KB tig: atl: Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1. aug: au: Hájek, Alan affil: Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra Australian Capital Territory, , Australia su: Counterfactuals (Logic) Philosophy Metaphysics Similarity (Psychology) Ethics sug: subj: Counterfactuals (Logic) Philosophy Metaphysics Similarity (Psychology) Ethics keyword: chances Counterfactuals Lewis similarity Stalnaker ab: To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were the case, C would be the case is true if and only if at the most similar A‐worlds, C is true. I will argue that there are general structural problems with the appeals to both "the most" and "similar". I will challenge any fixation on 'the most __ worlds', however we fill in the blank with a non‐trivial ordering of worlds: in ignoring worlds that are later in the ordering, it adjudicates various implausibly specific counterfactuals to be true. I will then raise foundational problems for appealing to 'similarity'—from consequents that are chancy, disjunctive antecedents, and unspecific antecedents more generally. I will also raise further problems for a number of specific proposals for understanding 'similarity'. A recurring theme will be the tension that may arise between probability and similarity considerations. I will end by arguing for a paradigm shift, replacing 'the most similar worlds' approach with one based on conditional chances. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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