Proper names as counterpart‐theoretic individual concepts.

Many philosophers and linguists have been attracted to counterpart theory as a framework for natural language semantics. I raise a novel problem for counterpart theory involving simple declarative sentences with proper names. To resolve this problem, counterpart theorists must introduce the notion o...

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Published in:Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 110; no. 3; pp. 1152 - 1182
Main Author: Kirkpatrick, James Ravi
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell May2025
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Proper names as counterpart‐theoretic individual concepts.
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        au: Kirkpatrick, James Ravi
        affil: University of Oxford & Magdalen College, Oxford
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        Names
        Semantics
        Philosophy
        Linguistics
        Metaphysics
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          Names
          Semantics
          Philosophy
          Linguistics
          Metaphysics
      keyword:
        counterpart theory
        david lewis
        proper names
        saul kripke
      ab: Many philosophers and linguists have been attracted to counterpart theory as a framework for natural language semantics. I raise a novel problem for counterpart theory involving simple declarative sentences with proper names. To resolve this problem, counterpart theorists must introduce the notion of a counterpart in the semantics of the non‐modal fragment of language. I develop my preferred solution: a novel theory of proper names as counterpart‐theoretic individual concepts. The resulting view highlights a hitherto unnoticed fact: counterpart theorists should formulate their theory, not by modifying the standard semantics for modal operators, but by modifying the standard semantics for names and variables.
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