Attention, consciousness, and inattentional blindness.
This paper examines the connection between two distinct mental phenomena: attention and phenomenal consciousness. I identify two types of views. Equivalency views maintain that attention is both necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. Dissociationist views deny this. This paper presen...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 6; pp. 1 - 26 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185350979&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185350979 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 205 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 185350979 10.1007/s11229-025-05068-6 ppf: 1 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Attention, consciousness, and inattentional blindness. aug: au: Wentzell, Alexander affil: https://ror.org/01yc7t268 Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, 63130-4899, St. Louis, MO, USA su: Inattentional blindness Consciousness Dilemma Attention Argument sug: subj: Inattentional blindness Consciousness Dilemma Attention Argument keyword: Phenomenal consciousness ab: This paper examines the connection between two distinct mental phenomena: attention and phenomenal consciousness. I identify two types of views. Equivalency views maintain that attention is both necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. Dissociationist views deny this. This paper presents a novel argument for dissociationism, by way of an empirical phenomenon called "inattentional blindness." Inattentional blindness occurs when subjects engaged in an attention-demanding task fail to see an otherwise visible but task-irrelevant stimulus. Dialectically, IB is unanimously cited by proponents of equivalency views as providing empirical support for their claims. I argue this thinking is backward: short of evincing equivalency views, inattentional blindness experiments create a dilemma. Resolved in one way, this dilemma falsifies the sufficiency claim. Resolved in the other, it falsifies the necessity claim. Thus, short of supporting the view, IB shows equivalency views are false. I close by considering how this result also limits which dissociationist view enjoys empirical support as well. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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