Conscience and Bad Conscience.
This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morality (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the "will's memory" (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 577 - 591 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185398360&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185398360 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 33 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185398360 10.1111/ejop.12991 ppf: 577 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Conscience and Bad Conscience. aug: au: Snelson, Avery affil: Department of Philosophy, Seattle University, Seattle WA, , USA su: Conscience Philosophy Metaphysics Punishment Internalization (Social psychology) sug: subj: Conscience Philosophy Metaphysics Punishment Internalization (Social psychology) ab: This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morality (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the "will's memory" (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor commitments, while bad conscience is that "other gloomy thing" (GM II, 4), gloomy because it is a self‐punishing faculty that produces feelings of guilt. In addition to having different functions, conscience and bad conscience have distinct causal origins. Conscience originated as a memory of "I will nots" inculcated by punishment (GM II, 3), whereas bad conscience is produced by the process of "internalization" (GM II, 16)—not punishment (GM II, 14–15). It would seem to be possible, then, that an agent could have a conscience without having a bad conscience. The sovereign individual is sometimes interpreted in such terms. I argue that this separation is impossible, however. An agent would be incapable of generating and sustaining the motivation to honor commitments, thus having a conscience, without having undergone the process of internalization, necessitating the presence of bad conscience as well. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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