Attention and Attendabilia: The Perception of Attentional Affordances.
Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible attendabilia. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of p...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 493 - 514 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185398368&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185398368 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 33 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185398368 10.1111/ejop.13010 ppf: 493 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 2.1MB tig: atl: Attention and Attendabilia: The Perception of Attentional Affordances. aug: au: McClelland, Tom affil: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Cambridge su: Attention Philosophy periodicals Philosophy Neurology Phenomenology sug: subj: Attention Philosophy periodicals Philosophy Neurology Phenomenology ab: Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible attendabilia. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a sensitivity to affordances. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot as grippable and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things as attendable. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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