The Threefold Essence of Consciousness: Brentano versus Pfänder.
Building on Uriah Kriegel's recent work on the varieties of consciousness, I consider the question of how many irreducible and fundamental kinds of consciousness there are. This is the project of a fundamental classification of consciousness (C‐taxonomy), which will be approached with reference to t...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 591 - 613 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185398369&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185398369 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 33 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185398369 10.1111/ejop.13011 ppf: 591 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.9MB tig: atl: The Threefold Essence of Consciousness: Brentano versus Pfänder. aug: au: Erhard, Christopher affil: Forschungsstelle Neurophilosophie und Ethik in den Neurowissenschaften, Ludwig‐Maximilians‐Universität München, München su: Consciousness Philosophy periodicals Phenomenology Judgment (Logic) Taxonomy sug: subj: Consciousness Philosophy periodicals Phenomenology Judgment (Logic) Taxonomy ab: Building on Uriah Kriegel's recent work on the varieties of consciousness, I consider the question of how many irreducible and fundamental kinds of consciousness there are. This is the project of a fundamental classification of consciousness (C‐taxonomy), which will be approached with reference to two figures from the (early) phenomenological tradition, i.e., Franz Brentano and Alexander Pfänder. Both philosophers advocate tripartite taxonomies, thereby opposing the still widely held view that only algedonic and sensory phenomenology exist. After explaining the project of C‐taxonomy, I discuss Brentano's and Pfänder's trialisms. My main aim is to show that Pfänder's view, according to which consciousness is exhausted by "object‐consciousness", feeling, and striving, when supplemented by Husserlian ideas, is to be preferred to Brentano's classification, according to which the basic mental kinds are mere presentations, judgments, and "phenomena of love and hate". I criticize Brentano's separation of doxastically neutral presentations from "positing" judgments, as well as his unification of feelings, emotions, desires, strivings, decisions, and volitions into one basic class. Finally, I reflect on the deeper reasons for Brentano's and Pfänder's divergent taxonomies, which are rooted in their different views of the "mark of the mental" and their different approaches to the active/passive distinction within the mental realm. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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