Wholesale moral error for naturalists.
The article addresses a challenge posed by Akhlaghi against realist moral naturalism and moral non-cognitivism, focusing on their inability to accommodate the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. The author defends realist moral naturalism by arguing that even if naturalism is assumed to...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 59; no. 2; pp. 209 - 222 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185424088&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185424088 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00225363 OJ8 jtl: Journal of Value Inquiry issn: 00225363 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 59 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 185424088 10.1007/s10790-023-09938-5 ppf: 209 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 645KB tig: atl: Wholesale moral error for naturalists. aug: au: Stamatiadis-Bréhier, Alexios affil: https://ror.org/04mhzgx49 Department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel su: Naturalism Moral realism Epistemics Metaethics sug: subj: Naturalism Moral realism Epistemics Metaethics ab: The article addresses a challenge posed by Akhlaghi against realist moral naturalism and moral non-cognitivism, focusing on their inability to accommodate the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. The author defends realist moral naturalism by arguing that even if naturalism is assumed to be true, it can still reject the claim that it cannot explain such errors. The paper outlines three scenarios where wholesale moral error remains epistemically possible under naturalism: the non-existence of moral facts, the existence of moral facts in a way that leads to error, and the temporally restricted existence of moral principles. The discussion aims to deepen the understanding of moral naturalism and error theory while engaging with Akhlaghi's requirements for meta-ethical theories. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Value Inquiry is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Value Inquiry holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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