From self-knowledge to becoming-self. Is Nietzsche anti-platonic in this respect?
Nietzsche criticizes the Apollonian ideal of self-knowledge, which is at the heart of Socrates' and Plato's theoretical ideals. From this point of view, the Dionysian process of becoming oneself seems to counter it. Our aim here is to show that the Delphic sentence, as taken up by Plato, is not at a...
| Publicado en: | Anuario Filosófico Vol. 58; no. 2; pp. 305 - 324 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, SA
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Nietzsche criticizes the Apollonian ideal of self-knowledge, which is at the heart of Socrates' and Plato's theoretical ideals. From this point of view, the Dionysian process of becoming oneself seems to counter it. Our aim here is to show that the Delphic sentence, as taken up by Plato, is not at all content to be a theoretical ideal but leads directly to practice and to becoming oneself. Nietzsche critica el ideal apolíneo del autoconocimiento, que está en el corazón de los ideales teóricos de Sócrates y Platón. Desde este punto de vista, el proceso dionisíaco de llegar a ser uno mismo parece oponerse a él. Nuestro objetivo aquí es mostrar que la sentencia délfica, tal como la retoma Platón, no se limita en absoluto un ideal teórico, sino que conduce directamente a la práctica y a convertirse en uno mismo. |
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