Nietzsche, Kant, and the unity of the subject.
According to a prominent, broadly Kantian objection to Nietzsche's account of the self, only a self or 'I' of the sort he seems steadfastly to deny could possibly come to be misled about the self in the way he claims we are. In this article, I'll argue that this criticism is mistaken. There are, I s...
| Publicado en: | Inquiry Vol. 68; no. 5; pp. 1299 - 1326 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185527836&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185527836 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0020174X B8P jtl: Inquiry issn: 0020174X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 68 iid: 5 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 185527836 10.1080/0020174X.2025.2449678 ppf: 1299 ppct: 27 formats: tig: atl: Nietzsche, Kant, and the unity of the subject. aug: au: Fowles, Christopher affil: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK su: Self Concord Metaphysics Criticism sug: subj: Self Concord Metaphysics Criticism keyword: Kant metaphysical subject Nietzsche substance metaphysics the self ab: According to a prominent, broadly Kantian objection to Nietzsche's account of the self, only a self or 'I' of the sort he seems steadfastly to deny could possibly come to be misled about the self in the way he claims we are. In this article, I'll argue that this criticism is mistaken. There are, I suggest, three different ways of fleshing out the objection, each of which fails to present an effective challenge to Nietzsche's view. The Kantian criticisms either advance claims that Nietzsche can readily accept or presume metaphysical commitments he explicitly rejects. In the course of elaborating and rejecting the different versions of the Kantian criticism, I advance an account of Nietzsche's principal target in his critical remarks on the self. His main focus, I contend, should be understood as a minimally substantive subject embedded in a schema that separates doers from deeds. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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