What's in a name? Qualitativism and parsimony.

According to qualitativism, thisness is not a fundamental feature of reality; facts about particular things are metaphysically second-rate. In this paper, I advance an argument for qualitativism from ideological parsimony. Supposing that reality fundamentally contains an array of propertied things,...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 5; pp. 1361 - 1382
Autor principal: Murphy, Daniel S.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185649412&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 185649412
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318116
        4L8
      jtl: Philosophical Studies
      issn: 00318116
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2025
      vid: 182
      iid: 5
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        185649412
        10.1007/s11098-024-02280-x
      ppf: 1361
      ppct: 21
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 931KB
      tig:
        atl: What's in a name? Qualitativism and parsimony.
      aug:
        au: Murphy, Daniel S.
        affil:
          https://ror.org/00q369629 Philosophy Department, Le Moyne College, Syracuse, NY, USA
          https://ror.org/05a4pj207 Philosophy Department, SUNY Cortland, Cortland, NY, USA
      su:
        Parsimonious models
        Ideology
        Philosophy periodicals
        Philosophy
        Metaphysics
      sug:
        subj:
          Parsimonious models
          Ideology
          Philosophy periodicals
          Philosophy
          Metaphysics
      keyword:
        Generalism
        Ideological parsimony
        Parsimony
        Qualitativism
        Thisness
      ab: According to qualitativism, thisness is not a fundamental feature of reality; facts about particular things are metaphysically second-rate. In this paper, I advance an argument for qualitativism from ideological parsimony. Supposing that reality fundamentally contains an array of propertied things, non-qualitativists employ a distinct name (or constant) for each fundamental thing. I argue that these names encode a type of worldly structure (thisness structure) that offends against parsimony and that qualitativists can eliminate without incurring a comparable parsimony-offense.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Philosophical Studies
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2025
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N