Vagueness without truth functionality? No worries.
Among theories of vagueness, supervaluationism stands out for its non–truth functional account of the logical connectives. For example, the disjunction of two atomic statements that are not determinately true or false can, itself, come out either true or indeterminate, depending on its content—a con...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 5; pp. 1091 - 1114 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jun2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185649419&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185649419 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2025 vid: 182 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 185649419 10.1007/s11098-025-02318-8 ppf: 1091 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Vagueness without truth functionality? No worries. aug: au: Donnelly, Bret affil: https://ror.org/02ttsq026 Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA su: Vagueness (Philosophy) Metaphysics Philosophy periodicals Truth Philosophers sug: subj: Vagueness (Philosophy) Metaphysics Philosophy periodicals Truth Philosophers keyword: Conceptual spaces Penumbral connections Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Supervaluationism Truth functionality Vagueness ab: Among theories of vagueness, supervaluationism stands out for its non–truth functional account of the logical connectives. For example, the disjunction of two atomic statements that are not determinately true or false can, itself, come out either true or indeterminate, depending on its content—a consequence several philosophers find problematic. Smith (2016) turns this point against supervaluationism most pressingly, arguing that truth functionality is essential to any adequate model of truth. But this conclusion is too strong. Here, I argue that the problem with standard forms of supervaluationism is not the failure of truth functionality per se, but rather that they lack the structural resources necessary to algorithmically assign truth values to sentences based on their respective subject matters. However, recent developments of supervaluationism, which draw upon the cognitive science framework of conceptual spaces, resolve this issue. By incorporating conceptual information directly into their model-theoretic representations of the subject matters of sentences, these newer frameworks retain sensitivity to conceptual relations while providing consistent, content-based valuations of truth. Hence, their lack of truth functionality is nothing to worry about. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|