Managerial Ability and Debt Choice.

Using a sample of 54,964 firm‐year observations of US public firms during the period 2001 to 2020, we investigate how managerial ability affects corporate debt choice. We find evidence that managerial ability is negatively associated with the use of bank debt. This finding remains robust to a batter...

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Publicado en:Abacus Vol. 61; no. 2; pp. 304 - 345
Autores principales: Alam, Md Samsul, Hasan, Mostafa Monzur, Alam, Nurul, Islam, Md Shahidul
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Managerial Ability and Debt Choice.
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          Alam, Md Samsul
          Hasan, Mostafa Monzur
          Alam, Nurul
          Islam, Md Shahidul
        affil:
          Derby Business School, University of Derby,, UK
          Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance, Macquarie Business School, Macquarie University, Sydney NSW, 2109,, Australia
          The University of Sydney Business School, The University of Sydney, Camperdown NSW, 2006,, Australia
          Essex Business School, University of Essex,, UK
      su:
        Executive ability (Management)
        Corporate debt
        Economic impact
        Corporate governance
        Machine learning
        Debt management
        Bank loans
        Organizational performance
        United States
      sug:
        subj:
          United States
          Executive ability (Management)
          Corporate debt
          Economic impact
          Corporate governance
          Machine learning
          Debt management
          Bank loans
          Organizational performance
      keyword:
        Debt choice
        Financial constraints
        Information asymmetry
        Managerial ability
      ab: Using a sample of 54,964 firm‐year observations of US public firms during the period 2001 to 2020, we investigate how managerial ability affects corporate debt choice. We find evidence that managerial ability is negatively associated with the use of bank debt. This finding remains robust to a battery of robustness tests, including alternative measures of managerial ability and debt choice, various econometric specifications, and a range of endogeneity tests. Using the sudden death of the CEO as an exogenous shock to managerial ability, our difference‐in‐differences regression suggests a negative causal relationship between managerial ability and reliance on bank debt. Further, using advanced machine learning models, we identify that managerial ability is a highly influential variable in predicting firms' debt choices. Our cross‐sectional tests indicate that this relationship is more pronounced in the presence of higher information opacity, weaker corporate governance, and poor financial conditions. In additional tests, we show that firms with more able managers use more unsecured debt and public debt. Taken together, our findings suggest that managerial ability matters in shaping corporate debt choice.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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