Hinge-certainty and the asymmetricality of ‘deep moral disagreement’.
The idea of deep disagreement, as a peculiarly distinct kind of disagreement, was seminally introduced by Fogelin. His diagnosis of the problems posed by deep disagreement was based on what at the time was the unappreciated insight and wisdom of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969). Many epistemologis...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 5; pp. 1 - 30 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185698590&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185698590 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2025 vid: 205 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 185698590 10.1007/s11229-025-04996-7 ppf: 1 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Hinge-certainty and the asymmetricality of ‘deep moral disagreement’. aug: au: Pleasants, Nigel affil: https://ror.org/03yghzc09 Department of Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology, University of Exeter, EX4 4RJ, Exeter, UK sug: keyword: Deep moral disagreement Hinge epistemology Hinge-certainty Moral hinges Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy ab: The idea of deep disagreement, as a peculiarly distinct kind of disagreement, was seminally introduced by Fogelin. His diagnosis of the problems posed by deep disagreement was based on what at the time was the unappreciated insight and wisdom of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969). Many epistemologists of deep disagreement nowadays draw on the flourishing research programme of hinge epistemology that derives from On Certainty, and define deep disagreement as a clash of conflicting ‘hinge commitments’. The idea that deep moral disagreement is a distinct subset of deep disagreement, grounded on conflicting moral hinge commitments, has recently come to the fore. This paper critically examines the plausibility of that idea, and the adequacy of hinge epistemologists’ deployment of the concept of hinge commitment to the analysis of deep disagreement. I argue that hinge epistemologists of deep disagreement disregard, ignore, or conflate key distinctions between subjective and objective certainty, and universal and local certainty, in their conception and deployment of the concept of hinge commitment. With the aid of these distinctions, I reveal the individualistic assumptions and framework that epistemologists project onto the idea of deep moral disagreement, and argue that ‘objective’ hinge-certainty is a social property of ways of life, rather than of individual psyches. The paper culminates with a demonstration of why, and how, deep moral disagreements are asymmetrically deep, and disagreements not ‘in opinions but in form of life’ (Wittgenstein in Philosophical investigations. Blackwell, Oxford, 1968, § 241). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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