Interventions in inquiry.
A central question on the norms of inquiry—“zetetic norms”—concerns how they relate to epistemic norms. Both centrally involve learning about the world. Epistemic norms are thought to govern beliefs and credences, while zetetic norms extend to actions. A cluster of common views of epistemic norms ar...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 5; pp. 1 - 24 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=185719976&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 185719976 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2025 vid: 205 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 185719976 10.1007/s11229-025-04973-0 ppf: 1 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.7MB tig: atl: Interventions in inquiry. aug: au: Carr, Jennifer Rose affil: https://ror.org/0168r3w48 University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA sug: keyword: Accuracy Epistemic norms Inquiry Zetetic norms ab: A central question on the norms of inquiry—“zetetic norms”—concerns how they relate to epistemic norms. Both centrally involve learning about the world. Epistemic norms are thought to govern beliefs and credences, while zetetic norms extend to actions. A cluster of common views of epistemic norms are consequentialist: they hold that the fundamental source of epistemic value is true beliefs/accurate credences (veritism), or knowledge (gnosticism), and that rational beliefs are those that best promote epistemic value. It’s natural, then to think of zetetic norms as extending epistemic consequentialism to non-doxastic acts. This paper argues against these forms of zetetic consequentialism, with a focus on zetetic veritism. The general argument is this: we can come to have true beliefs in two distinct ways: by discovering truths and by creating truths. Only the former is zetetically valuable. Zetetic veritism falsely entails that, in many ordinary cases, good inquiry requires creating truths: intervening into the world to make it predictable, and indeed, to make it match our predictions. These arguments generalize to gnosticism and other popular forms of zetetic consequentialism. I discuss an alternative view, zetetic observationalism, according to which the aim of inquiry is learning by pure observation: the facts that matter for inquiry are independent of our interventions. This theory avoids counterexamples to zetetic veritism, but has surprising consequences: that learning answers to questions under inquiry often has no immediate value for inquiry, and that epistemology and inquiry don’t value accuracy in the same way. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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