Reference in memories from perceptual and non-perceptual experiences: a non-disjunctivist account including vicarious, oneiric and fictional remembering.

The paper argues for a non-disjunctivist account of reference in episodic memory. Our account provides a uniform theory of reference for episodic memories that root in veridical and non-veridical experiences. It is independent from the particular mechanisms that subserve the respective source experi...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 205; no. 5; pp. 1 - 30
Autores principales: Werning, Markus, Liefke, Kristina
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2025
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Reference in memories from perceptual and non-perceptual experiences: a non-disjunctivist account including vicarious, oneiric and fictional remembering.
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        au:
          Werning, Markus
          Liefke, Kristina
        affil: https://ror.org/04tsk2644 Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
      sug:
      keyword:
        Dreams
        Episodic memory
        Fiction
        Intentionalism
        Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology
        Reference
        Referential parasitism
        Relationalism
        Trace minimalism
        Vicarious memory
      ab: The paper argues for a non-disjunctivist account of reference in episodic memory. Our account provides a uniform theory of reference for episodic memories that root in veridical and non-veridical experiences. It is independent from the particular mechanisms that subserve the respective source experiences. We reject both relationalist and intentionalist analyses of memory and build our approach on Werning and Liefke’s theory of referential parasitism and Werning’s theory of trace minimalism. The motivation for our non-disjunctivist account is the assumption that perceptual and non-perceptual memories with an episodic character share a uniform underlying causal mechanism and thus make up one and the same natural kind.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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