The Levitating Firm.
The article discusses the concept of "levitating firms," which refers to corporations that own shares in one another, creating a network that diminishes market discipline and allows management to operate without accountability to shareholders. This phenomenon, termed "concatenated ownership," leads...
| Publicado en: | Independent Review Vol. 30; no. 1; pp. 97 - 118 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Independent Institute
Summer2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=185816095&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 185816095 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10861653 TIR jtl: Independent Review issn: 10861653 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Summer2025 vid: 30 iid: 1 pid: 2510 pub: Independent Institute artinfo: ui: 185816095 ppf: 97 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 8.8MB tig: atl: The Levitating Firm. aug: au: KOPPL, ROGER affil: Professor of finance in the Whitman School of Management of Syracuse University Associate director of the Whitman School's Institute for an Entrepreneurial Society su: Business & politics Businesspeople Stockholder wealth Stocks (Finance) Investment Company Act of 1940 sug: subj: Business & politics Businesspeople Stockholder wealth Stocks (Finance) Investment Company Act of 1940 ab: The article discusses the concept of "levitating firms," which refers to corporations that own shares in one another, creating a network that diminishes market discipline and allows management to operate without accountability to shareholders. This phenomenon, termed "concatenated ownership," leads to a separation of ownership from control, enabling corporate management to prioritize their interests over those of shareholders, contrary to the principles of shareholder capitalism. The author argues that this structure undermines consumer sovereignty and promotes stakeholder capitalism, which is portrayed as a misguided response to the perceived shortcomings of shareholder capitalism. The article critiques the ideological shift towards stakeholder capitalism, suggesting it serves managerial interests rather than maximizing shareholder wealth, and calls for reforms to address the issues stemming from corporate self-ownership. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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