Metaphysical Rationalism Requires Grounding Indeterminism.

Metaphysical rationalism is the view that, necessarily, every fact that stands in need of a metaphysical (grounding) explanation has one. Varieties of metaphysical rationalism include classical theism, Spinozism, spacetime priority monism, and axiarchism. Grounding indeterminism is the view that the...

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Publicado en:Journal of the American Philosophical Association Vol. 11; no. 2; pp. 1 - 21
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jun2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Metaphysical Rationalism Requires Grounding Indeterminism.
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        Free will & determinism
        Spacetime
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        Theism
        Explanation
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          Free will & determinism
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          Theism
          Explanation
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        contingency
        explanation
        grounding
        necessitarianism
        principle of sufficient reason
      ab: Metaphysical rationalism is the view that, necessarily, every fact that stands in need of a metaphysical (grounding) explanation has one. Varieties of metaphysical rationalism include classical theism, Spinozism, spacetime priority monism, and axiarchism. Grounding indeterminism is the view that the same ground, in precisely the same circumstances, might not have grounded what it in fact grounds. I argue that a plausible defense of any form of metaphysical rationalism requires a commitment to grounding indeterminism.
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    language: English
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