Sense and the Computation of Reference.
The paper shows how ideas that explain the sense of an expression as a method or algorithm for finding its reference, preshadowed in Frege’s dictum that sense is the way in which a referent is given, can be formalized on the basis of the ideas in Thomason (1980). To this end, the function that sends...
| Publicado en: | Linguistics & Philosophy Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 473 - 505 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=18597383&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 18597383 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650157 OJI jtl: Linguistics & Philosophy issn: 01650157 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2005 vid: 28 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 18597383 10.1007/s10988-004-7684-1 ppf: 473 ppct: 32 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 459KB tig: atl: Sense and the Computation of Reference. aug: au: Muskens, Reinhard affil: Department of Linguistics, Tilburg University, 5000 LE Tilburg The Netherlands su: Linguistics Algorithms Logic Semantics (Philosophy) Paradox Language & languages sug: subj: Linguistics Algorithms Logic Semantics (Philosophy) Paradox Language & languages ab: The paper shows how ideas that explain the sense of an expression as a method or algorithm for finding its reference, preshadowed in Frege’s dictum that sense is the way in which a referent is given, can be formalized on the basis of the ideas in Thomason (1980). To this end, the function that sends propositions to truth values or sets of possible worlds in Thomason (1980) must be replaced by a relation and the meaning postulates governing the behaviour of this relation must be given in the form of a logic program. The resulting system does not only throw light on the properties of sense and their relation to computation, but also shows circular behaviour if some ingredients of the Liar Paradox are added. The connection is natural, as algorithms can be inherently circular and the Liar is explained as expressing one of those. Many ideas in the present paper are closely related to those in Moschovakis (1994), but receive a considerably lighter formalization. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Linguistics & Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2005. All Rights Reserved. item: Linguistics & Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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