A Critical Analysis of Current Characterizations of Categorical Properties: Their Insufficiencies in Addressing the Individuation Regress in Dispositionalism.

Dispositionalism confronts the well‐known challenge of the regress of the individuation of dispositional properties. Proposed solutions to this issue can be broadly categorised into two types: Alexander Bird's holistic‐graph approach, which asserts that dispositional properties can be uniquely indiv...

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Publicado en:Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 91; no. 3; pp. 1 - 12
Autor principal: Yu, Jing
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Jun2025
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        atl: A Critical Analysis of Current Characterizations of Categorical Properties: Their Insufficiencies in Addressing the Individuation Regress in Dispositionalism.
      aug:
        au: Yu, Jing
        affil: Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands
      su:
        Disposition (Philosophy)
        Individuation (Philosophy)
        Critical analysis
        Bird, Alexander
        Philosophy
      sug:
        subj:
          Disposition (Philosophy)
          Individuation (Philosophy)
          Critical analysis
          Bird, Alexander
          Philosophy
      keyword:
        analytic metaphysics
        categorical properties
        dispositionalism
        individuation regress
        ontology of physics
      ab: Dispositionalism confronts the well‐known challenge of the regress of the individuation of dispositional properties. Proposed solutions to this issue can be broadly categorised into two types: Alexander Bird's holistic‐graph approach, which asserts that dispositional properties can be uniquely individuated by their positions within the holistic graph formed by manifestation‐stimulus relations, and the dispositional‐categorical mixed/dual views, which introduce non‐dispositional (categorical) properties to circumvent the regress. This article critically examines the latter approach, contending that the current characterizations of categorical properties within this framework are problematic. These characterizations either obscure the very nature of the mixed/dual views, undermine the fundamentality and objectivity of categorical properties, or inadvertently reintroduce dispositional elements. In the first two cases, categorical properties fail to serve as a viable solution to the individuation regress. In cases where dispositional elements are inadvertently introduced, the regress remains unresolved unless proponents of the mixed/dual views invoke a holistic graph ostensibly distinct from Bird's. However, upon closer examination, this article demonstrates that such a holistic graph ultimately proves identical to Bird's. Consequently, adopting this approach would render the mixed/dual view redundant, failing to offer a distinct and independent resolution to the problem. By demonstrating the deficiencies in these characterizations, this article compels mixed/dual theorists to devise alternative characterizations of categorical properties.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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