Social‐benefits stigma and subsequent competitiveness.
We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore how benefit‐eligibility stigma drives subsequent decisions to enter competition. We induce a stigma associated with a low‐status benefit and then introduce "plausible deniability" to reduce this stigma by expanding benefit eligibility to a middle‐status...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 63; no. 3; pp. 903 - 926 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore how benefit‐eligibility stigma drives subsequent decisions to enter competition. We induce a stigma associated with a low‐status benefit and then introduce "plausible deniability" to reduce this stigma by expanding benefit eligibility to a middle‐status group. When newly‐eligible individuals qualify for the benefit, their rate of entry into a subsequent and unrelated tournament is reduced by 17–20 percentage points compared to the treatment in which they do not qualify. A potential interpretation of our results would suggest expanding for certain government assistance programs may produce unintended consequences for the newly eligible. |
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