| Sumario: | Interpreters of Kant have long struggled with his analysis of original sin and grace in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. One long-standing interpretation sees Kant's stance on these theological concepts as incompatible with his philosophical commitments to human freedom and moral responsibility. Existing attempts to rescue Kant from this apparent contradiction typically do so by weakening his account of original sin, maintaining that Kant insists on a human capacity to overcome radical evil unaided. This article argues that neither of these interpretations is correct, illustrating instead how Kant avoids contradiction even as he maintains that we may need divine aid to fulfill our moral obligations. Understanding Kant's engagement with the theological concepts of total depravity and progressive sanctification, I argue, gives rise to a noncontradictory reading of Kant's work in which he makes room for a modified form of grace that coheres with his philosophical commitments.
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