Radical ontic structural realism as a structuralist existence monism.
Radical ontic structural realism (ROSR) argues that structure is all that there is and that objects are metaphysically eliminable. By making such claims, ROSR is widely considered metaphysically obscure. To address this, I propose a novel characterisation of ROSR, drawing on two metaphysical concept...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 206; no. 2; pp. 1 - 25 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=186677861&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 186677861 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2025 vid: 206 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 186677861 10.1007/s11229-025-05120-5 ppf: 1 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Radical ontic structural realism as a structuralist existence monism. aug: au: Meyer, Aiden affil: https://ror.org/01ej9dk98 School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia su: Philosophy of science Spacetime Monism Problem solving Religious studies sug: subj: Philosophy of science Spacetime Monism Problem solving Religious studies keyword: Naturalized metaphysics Ontic structural realism Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Spinoza Structural realism ab: Radical ontic structural realism (ROSR) argues that structure is all that there is and that objects are metaphysically eliminable. By making such claims, ROSR is widely considered metaphysically obscure. To address this, I propose a novel characterisation of ROSR, drawing on two metaphysical concepts: existence monism, attributed to Spinoza by Bennett (1984) and Spinoza's concept of modes. These concepts are adaptable to ROSR, which becomes a structuralist existence monism, where putative objects are reconceptualised as modes of the world's structure. This proposal directly contributes to solving two problems ROSR faces: (A) the need for a metaphysical framework clarifying ROSR's key claims and (B) ROSR's need to account for the apparent plurality of objects we experience. Drawing on Wallace and Timpson's (The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61:697-727) spacetime state realism, I suggest a solution to a third problem, (problem C) McKenzie's (Philosophy of Physics, 2:1-23) challenge to ROSR's status as a substantive metaphysical doctrine. My reformulation of ROSR is a natural interpretation of this solution. I also compare my proposal to French's (2014) ROSR, and Esfeld and Lam's (2011) moderate structural realism, highlighting my proposal's advantages. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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