Rationally warranted promise: the virtue-economic account of pursuit-worthiness.

Pursuing a scientific idea is often justified by the promise associated with it. Philosophers of science have proposed various ways of unpacking this idea of promise, including more specific indicators. Economic models in particular emphasise the trade-off between an idea’s benefits and its costs. T...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 206; no. 2; pp. 1 - 34
Autores principales: Duerr, Patrick M., Fischer, Enno
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2025
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Rationally warranted promise: the virtue-economic account of pursuit-worthiness.
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          Duerr, Patrick M.
          Fischer, Enno
        affil:
          https://ror.org/03a1kwz48 von Weizsäcker Centre for Foundations of Science, University of Tübingen, Doblerstraße 33, 72074, Tübingen, Germany
          https://ror.org/042aqky30 Institute of Philosophy, Dresden University of Technology, Zellescher Weg 17, 01069, Dresden, Germany
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      keyword:
        Economics Applied Economics Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy
        Kuhn
        Laudan
        Pursuit-worthiness
        Reflective equilibrium
        Research heuristics
        Theoretical virtues
        Theory choice
      ab: Pursuing a scientific idea is often justified by the promise associated with it. Philosophers of science have proposed various ways of unpacking this idea of promise, including more specific indicators. Economic models in particular emphasise the trade-off between an idea’s benefits and its costs. Taking up this Peirce-inspired idea, we spell out the metaphor of such a cost-benefit analysis for scientific ideas. It fruitfully urges a set of salient meta-methodological questions that accounts of scientific pursuit-worthiness ought to address. In line with such a meta-methodological framework, we also articulate and explore an appealing and auspicious concretisation—what we shall dub “the virtue-economic account of pursuit-worthiness”: cognitive benefits and costs of an idea, we suggest, should be characterised in terms of an idea’s theoretical virtues, such as empirical adequacy, explanatory power, or coherence. Assessments of pursuit-worthiness are deliberative judgements in which scientifically competent evaluators weigh and compare the prospects of such virtues, subject to certain rationality constraints that ensure historical and contemporary scientific circumspection, coherence and systematicity. The virtue-economic account, we show, sheds new light on the normativity of scientific pursuit, methodological pluralism in science, and the rationality of historical science.
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