How to be a Monist about Ground: A Guide for Pluralists.

Is there one univocal or generic notion of ground? Monists answer yes, while pluralists answer no. Pluralists argue that monism cannot meet plausible constraints on an adequate theory of ground. My aim in this paper is to articulate a monist theory of ground that can satisfy the pluralist constraint...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 6; pp. 2261 - 2279
Autor principal: Haderlie, Derek Christian
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Haderlie, Derek Christian
        affil: https://ror.org/047rhhm47 Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA
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        Monism
        Pluralism
        Modern philosophy
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          Monism
          Pluralism
          Modern philosophy
      ab: Is there one univocal or generic notion of ground? Monists answer yes, while pluralists answer no. Pluralists argue that monism cannot meet plausible constraints on an adequate theory of ground. My aim in this paper is to articulate a monist theory of ground that can satisfy the pluralist constraints in a way that leaves the pluralists with no reasons not to endorse the monist picture of ground. I do this by adopting a tripartite conception of ground and then showing that it has the resources to vindicate monism while satisfying the pluralist constraints on a theory of ground.
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