Bodily expressions and affective experiences: a motivational connection.
In this paper I will deal with the relationship between affective experiences and bodily expressions. In contemporary embodied constitution theories of affectivity, bodily expressions are argued to be constitutive parts of affective phenomena. Proponents of these theories often criticize the idea th...
| Publicado en: | Continental Philosophy Review Vol. 58; no. 3; pp. 379 - 402 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187190002&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187190002 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13872842 OEF jtl: Continental Philosophy Review issn: 13872842 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 58 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 187190002 10.1007/s11007-025-09686-2 ppf: 379 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 952KB tig: atl: Bodily expressions and affective experiences: a motivational connection. aug: au: Forlè, Francesca affil: https://ror.org/01gmqr298 Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy su: Kindness Friendship Motivation (Psychology) Stein, Edith, Saint, 1891-1942 Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938 sug: subj: Kindness Friendship Motivation (Psychology) Stein, Edith, Saint, 1891-1942 Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938 keyword: Bodily expressions Embodied accounts of affectivity Husserl Motivational connections Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Stein ab: In this paper I will deal with the relationship between affective experiences and bodily expressions. In contemporary embodied constitution theories of affectivity, bodily expressions are argued to be constitutive parts of affective phenomena. Proponents of these theories often criticize the idea that bodily expressions are merely caused by the expressed affective experiences, but then they have the problem of accommodating the intuition that an affective experience somehow brings about its bodily expressions. In this paper I will propose a way out of this issue, maintaining that we can accommodate this intuition even without embracing a causal account of the relation between an affective experience and its bodily expressions. Indeed, I will maintain that such a causal account is to be rejected because it fails to adequately describe the phenomenon of bodily expressivity. I will propose that a motivational account, based on Husserl's (1952) and Stein's (1917) positions, is more apt. I will also show how it can account for the above-mentioned intuition, being therefore able to nicely complement embodied constitution accounts of affective phenomena. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Continental Philosophy Review is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Continental Philosophy Review holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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