Mind uploading and its metaphysical foundations: from role functionalism to realizer functionalism.
Mind uploading involves two technological approaches: brain simulation and brain replacement. To achieve immortality, these approaches must metaphysically satisfy the requirements of phenomenal consciousness and personal identity. This paper finds that to meet these requirements, brain simulation pr...
| Publicado en: | Phenomenology & the Cognitive Sciences Vol. 24; no. 4; pp. 1105 - 1127 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187436425&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187436425 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15687759 OKM jtl: Phenomenology & the Cognitive Sciences issn: 15687759 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 24 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 187436425 10.1007/s11097-025-10067-6 ppf: 1105 ppct: 22 formats: tig: atl: Mind uploading and its metaphysical foundations: from role functionalism to realizer functionalism. aug: au: Xia, Yong-Hong Li, Jianhui affil: https://ror.org/0493m8x04 Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai, No.18 Tangjiawan Jinfeng Road Xiangzhou District, 519085, Zhuhai City, Guangdong Province, P.R. China https://ror.org/022k4wk35 School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China su: Metaphysics Consciousness Functionals Self Brain mapping sug: subj: Metaphysics Consciousness Functionals Self Brain mapping keyword: Brain replacement Brain simulation. Mind uploading Personal identity Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Realizer functionalism Role functionalism Sensorimotor enactivism ab: Mind uploading involves two technological approaches: brain simulation and brain replacement. To achieve immortality, these approaches must metaphysically satisfy the requirements of phenomenal consciousness and personal identity. This paper finds that to meet these requirements, brain simulation presupposes the truth of role functionalism for mental states and ultra-role-functionalism for identity, while brain replacement presupposes the truth of realizer functionalism for both mental states and identity. To adjudicate these functionalist theories based not only on a priori considerations but also on empirical evidence, this paper introduces a confirmation process that moves from empirical observation (i.e., sensory substitution) to science (i.e., sensorimotor enactivism) and then to metaphysics. It finds that realizer functionalism aligns better with empirical observation than role functionalism. If realizer functionalism is a more reasonable theory, it would imply that brain simulation is impossible, while brain replacement remains a possibility. However, realizer functionalism is an empirically constrained metaphysics. While it commits to the metaphysical possibility of brain replacement, our analysis, based on relevant neuroscientific research, argues that it is unlikely to possess such a nomological possibility. Therefore, whether through brain simulation or brain replacement, it is unlikely that humans could achieve immortality through mind uploading. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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