Flummoxing expectations.
Expected utility theory often falls silent, even in cases where the correct rankings of options seems obvious. For instance, it fails to compare the Pasadena game to the Altadena game, despite the latter turning out better in every state. Decision theorists have attempted to fill these silences by p...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 700 - 729 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187456408&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187456408 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 59 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 187456408 10.1111/nous.12530 ppf: 700 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 588KB tig: atl: Flummoxing expectations. aug: au: Wilkinson, Hayden affil: University of Oxford su: Expected utility Decision theory Game theory Paradox Independence (Mathematics) sug: subj: Expected utility Decision theory Game theory Paradox Independence (Mathematics) ab: Expected utility theory often falls silent, even in cases where the correct rankings of options seems obvious. For instance, it fails to compare the Pasadena game to the Altadena game, despite the latter turning out better in every state. Decision theorists have attempted to fill these silences by proposing various extensions to expected utility theory. As I show in this paper, such extensions often fall silent too, even in cases where the correct ranking is intuitively obvious. But we can extend the theory further than has been done before—I offer a new extension, Invariant Value Theory, which deals neatly with those problem cases and also satisfies various desirable conditions. But other prima facie desirable conditions, including Independence, the theory violates. Is this a problem for the proposal? It may not be—in a new impossibility result, I show that no theory can satisfy Independence in full generality without violating several other conditions that together seem just as plausible. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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