Executive policymaking influence via the administrative apparatus.
Elected chief executives in the United States—that is, governors and presidents—routinely attempt to achieve their domestic policy goals by influencing the decision‐making of public agencies. I provide empirical assessments of the two most frequently theorized elected executive influence tactics: po...
| Publicado en: | Public Administration Review Vol. 85; no. 5; pp. 1445 - 1460 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep/Oct2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=187618147&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 187618147 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00333352 PBA jtl: Public Administration Review issn: 00333352 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep/Oct2025 vid: 85 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 187618147 10.1111/puar.13899 ppf: 1445 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 509KB tig: atl: Executive policymaking influence via the administrative apparatus. aug: au: Yackee, Susan Webb affil: University of Wisconsin‐Madison, Madison Wisconsin, , USA su: United States Public administration Policy sciences Government agencies Appointment to public office Governors Decentralization in government Executive power sug: subj: Public administration Policy sciences Government agencies United States Other federal government public administration Other provincial and territorial public administration Other local, municipal and regional public administration Other General Government Support Executive Offices Appointment to public office Governors Decentralization in government Executive power ab: Elected chief executives in the United States—that is, governors and presidents—routinely attempt to achieve their domestic policy goals by influencing the decision‐making of public agencies. I provide empirical assessments of the two most frequently theorized elected executive influence tactics: political appointments and the centralization of agency decision‐making. Using an expansive survey of the leaders in over 1800 state agencies, observational and experimental evidence are used to evaluate the effectiveness of these tactics. I find that state agency leaders believe that the appointment of officials to key agency posts allows the governor to better achieve his or her policy objectives than centralizing decision‐making, and Republican governors are seen as more successful in using these tactics than Democratic ones. Overall, the results provide a real‐world sense of how one government institution—the elected chief executive—tries to steer the policymaking of public managers and the government agencies that they lead. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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